Seminar Paper:

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ is a seminal text concerned primarily with the disciplines of logic and epistemology, and the role of language within these frameworks. The enigmatic text draws influence from the works of his mentor, Bertrand Russand, as well as other logicians such as Gottlob Frege.

                The book is organised over seven chapters, each consisting of a singular, cryptic sentence, elaborated upon in a series of footnotes. Russell notes in the preface that Wittgenstein’s endeavours centre around ‘the relation subsisting between thoughts, words, or sentences, and that which they refer to or mean’. Wittgenstein viewed language as much more than a simple, transparent act, but moreover the principal mechanism for establishing truth and understanding the world around us.

                Wittgenstein viewed each individual proposition as a combination of numerous atomic propositions. From these we create a picture; not necessarily a literal picture, but an amalgamation of the atomic propositions we combine. Wittgenstein found difficulty in defining his picture theory and backtracked several times. Peter Carruthers notes in his book ‘Tractarian Semantics’ that ‘it is not just a matter of constructing ever more detailed representations of the truth conditions of sentences… but constructing notations which will be logically or philosophically perspicuous’ (1989). Our unconscious works to manage all the intricate, complex rules of a language, and piece together the elements of a given proposition to establish truth or falsehood.

                This principle is consistent with work dating as far back as David Hume, a central influence, alongside Wittgenstein on Logical Positivism.  The foundations of verificationism established by Hume and elaborated upon by Alfred Jules Ayer permeate the Tractatus. Wittgenstein’s philosophy on language aims to find a verifiable truth value in any given proposition and consequently Wittgenstein acknowledges that any proposition has the capacity to be a false or a true picture. Similarly, the verification principle does not rely on a priori methodology to find truth, but only establishes truth through empirical, verifiable means.

                In Chapters 2 and 3 Wittgenstein outlines how he believes our thoughts are pictures of facts and this in turn is how we interpret the world. There is a link here with phenomenological thought. It poses the philosophical question; can we empirically verify our picture of given facts, without knowing if it is our subjective perception or a universal truth? We can however, consider these facts as provisionally true, but falsifiable (as defined in Karl Popper’s critique of the verification principle). 

                The seventh chapter of the Tractatus declares that, ‘of that which we cannot speak, we must remain silent’. This is encompassing of logical positivist ideology, in that the truth within any given statement lies within our cognitive means of verification, and of those propositions which are unverifiable ‘we must remain silent’. The unverifiable propositions are simply ‘emoting’ (as defined by Ayer), and can consequently be considered nonsensical.  

                The obscurity of the final chapter can also be perceived to reflect Wittgenstein’s overarching viewpoint of the role of philosophy. He says ‘Philosophy gives no pictures of reality and can neither confirm nor confute scientific investigation’. He asserts that without language philosophy could not exist and consequently philosophy is simply a critique of language itself. This is why Wittgenstein’s worked to uncover the way we perceive the world through language.

                Despite his work on establishing truth through language, Wittgenstein stated that ‘it is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists’. Wittgenstein acknowledged therefore that he needed to accept particular necessary truths and certitudes before he could analyse further. Before we can scrutinise our understanding of the world around us, we must recognise that language is the tool we will use for such an analysis. This certitude is undoubtedly the reason Wittgenstein attributed such prestige to the studying the philosophy of language.     

Franz Fanon: 'The Wretched of the Earth'

Franz Fanon’s seminal text ‘Wretched of the Earth’, first published in 1961, advocates a violent approach through which an occupied nation can emancipate itself from colonial oppression. His belief spawns from what he sees as a global divide; the world not being ‘at one’, with humanistic fundamentals overshadowed by racist ideologies. He notes the tangible divide between westernised Europe and underdeveloped Africa/Asia and views these differences to be rooted in colonial history and oppression. Previous colonisation and exploitation by developed countries lends itself to the on-going culture of creating and maintaining prejudices against the underdeveloped. Fanon says of this, we like to ‘keep the enslaved at arm’s length’. This is mirrored in the minimal coverage of the on-going poverty in Africa or furthermore in the western political tradition of making associations in public consciousness between entire countries and terrorism. Fanon considers this a process of dehumanisation, desensitising westerners to the crises faced by non-western humans. Fanon’s humanism is exemplified when he questions; ‘are we not all fellow-Europeans in the marrow of our bones?’ Even migrants to Western Europe from colonised countries tend to neglect the plight of their native man and homeland, becoming ever more wrapped up in western culture. Fanon attributes equal responsibility to all Europeans, proclaiming that we must ‘know ourselves in the light of truth’, and that ‘our ancestors enriched us at the hands of others’, consequently he considers the blood to be on the hands of every European.

                Fanon’s criticism of European colonisation and what he perceives as its indelible, damaging effects leads him to promote aggressive insurgency against western oppression. He epitomises his ideology when he says, ‘Europe has laid her hands on our continents, and we must slash at her fingers until she lets go… Let us start fighting’. Africa, and natives of underdeveloped countries are encouraged to unite and come together to fight against the hegemony of Europe.  This is reminiscent of Marxist ideals; both are seeking to achieve ‘revolutionary socialism’. In Fanon’s scenario the colonised can be seen to represent Marx’s proletariat, in their comparable fight against subjugation and oppression. Unless ‘revolutionary socialism’ is achieved Fanon asserts that, ‘one by one we will be defeated by our former masters’. His goal, he believes, can only be achieved through brute force; confronting state terror with bigger and better violence. This violence will humanise the colonised, making them into authentic, real human beings, and not simply passive zombies controlled by the west. To achieve this, the colonial system must be overthrown by any means necessary and there is no avoidance of this means as ‘national liberation is always violent’. Fanon’s concept is echoed in Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘overman’- the need to overcome and carve out our place in the world according to our own will, and not be constrained by our facticity.

                Fanon’s seemingly extreme ideology can be seen influencing revolutionaries such as Malcolm X and his struggle for black civil rights, his campaign advocated violent reprisal, applying the essence of Fanon’s work. A polarised example would be Ghandi, whom Fanon would have certainly seen as too acquiescent. Fanon’s text, although controversial, cannot be considered as simple aggression and belligerence; his ideas are rooted in humanism, egalitarianism and the breakdown of racial prejudice.